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Resumen:
El ensayo trata la posibilidad de cambiar la ética social a través del discurso del humanismo. Se 
subraya la base genética del comportamiento del ser humano, y la influencia que el medio ambiente 
puede tener sobre esto. Tomando como punto de partida la narrativa, y específicamente dos novelas 
españolas contemporáneos, se concluye que la narrativa ejerce una función de suma importancia en el 
desarrollo social, pero que dicha función es más allá del control del individuo artista, y que la ética es 
ex post facto, o sea producida por la narrativa, y no al revés.
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Abstract: 
This essay treats the possibility of changing ethical behavior through the influence of humanistic 
discourse. The focus herein is on the genetic base of human behavior, and the influence the 
environment has upon it. Taking narrative as a point of departure, specifically two contemporary 
Spanish novels, the paper concludes that narrative exercises an determining role in social development, 
but a role that is beyond the conscious control of the individual. Furthermore, ethics seem to be an ex 
post facto product of narrative, rather than the other way round.
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1. Can the humanities make us more humane?
Earlier this summer, in June of 2012 to be specific, I attended a conference at 
the Ateneo in Madrid. The theme of the conference was the relations between the 
sciences and the humanities in this, Spain’s Year of Neuroculture. One speaker in 
particular caught my attention with his fervent insistence that the world would be 
a better place if only the scientists in it were given a strong dose of humanities. It 
certainly appeared it would be better for him at least, as his company was in the 
business of bringing doses of the humanities to the offices of local businesses. 
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Specifically, they performed small theatrical productions on site that illustrated 
the correct responses to what otherwise would have appeared to be moral and 
ethical dilemmas in the business of business. On this theory, the proper dosage 
would convert corporate buccaneers into socially responsible citizens, who would 
henceforth design plowshares instead of swords, or something along those lines, 
you get the picture. Now, while I understand that his evaluation of the success of 
this program was anecdotal and, just perhaps, not the most objective one could 
hope for given his commercial interests, this did not rule out the possibility that 
he might be right.
Since my favorite pastime while listening to conference speakers is to prove 
them wrong—only in my head, of course, open warfare is in bad taste and doesn’t 
advance your career—I started thinking about the history of support for the arts 
and humanities. Even for someone with as poor a memory as I, it soon became ap-
parent that the rich and powerful have historically been the patrons of the arts, and 
open warfare with the Borgias, a Chinese emperor, the Russian Orthodox Church, 
or the Ford Foundation was also bad for your career, maybe very bad. But has this 
support translated into a better world, and if so is this transformation linked to 
neurological changes?
2. Can society change our genetic nature?
It is worth noting that the influence of the dominant social strata has produced 
recent genetic changes in our species, so socially induced neurological change is 
indeed possible. Following the advent of agriculture, some 11, 000 years ago, hu-
mans begin to show evidence of domestication. Farming led to the accumulation 
of wealth, hence to elites, who used their power to control aggression among their 
peasants. In vast segments of the new populations supported by agriculture, ag-
gression among the lower classes was counterproductive to the accumulation of 
wealth by their owners. Through harsh authoritarian rule, humans were selected for 
domestication. Those who chose to die on their feet rather than live on their knees 
were accommodated or, as the Japanese saying has it, the nails that stood up were 
hammered down. 
Indeed, in all domesticated animals, including humans beginning around 10,000 
years ago, we see a reduction in brain size and skull size (a reduction of about 10 per-
cent compared to Europeans from 20,000 years ago), changes in hair or coat color, 
smaller teeth, lower levels of aggression, and a willingness to submit to authority 
(Cochran and Harpending, 2009: 94). This pacification of the agricultural majority is 
reflected in the longitudinal data on human violence. There has been a hundredfold 
decline in homicide rates in European societies since the Middle Ages, from 100 per 
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100,000 per annum to a current 1 per 100,000 per annum (Daly and Wilson, 1988: 
48). The homicide rates in pre-state societies vary, with 10 to 60 percent of the men 
dying at the hands of another man (Daly and Wilson, 1988: 51; Keeley, 1996: 76). A 
typical tribal society loses about 0.5 percent of its population in combat every year. 
Had this same death rate been suffered by the rest of the population during the 
twentieth century, war deaths would have totaled two billion people instead of the 
150-300 million that actually occurred (Keeley, 1996: 83). Among the Yanomamo 
of Brazil, one of the last remaining hunter-gatherer groups, about 30 percent of 
adult males die from aggression over the course of their lifetimes (the figure is 59 
percent for the Jivaros of Ecuador and Peru) (Chagnon, 1992: 116). Comparatively, 
this same rate holds for chimpanzees, our hominoid cousins (96-99 percent of their 
DNA sequence corresponds exactly to our own, Chimpanzee Consortium, 2005: 
77), who also practice constant warfare (Mitani, Watts, and Muller, 2002: 18). Among 
the Yanomamo, those who kill and survive have 3 times as many children as those 
who do not kill, while amongst chimpanzees 36 percent of all conceptions fall to the 
alpha chimp (Chagnon, 1992: 121; Constable, y otros, 2001: 1282). 
But if humans have truly become less aggressive when it comes to killing each 
other, have they become less aggressive when it comes to other areas of social bel-
ligerence? If it is no longer ethical to take your neighbor’s life, is it now any less 
ethical to use social power and influence to take his livelihood? In his book The Bet-
ter Angels of our Nature: Why Violence has Declined (2011), Steven Pinker attributes the 
decline of violence over the last 10,000 years to cultural phenomena which he calls 
variously the Pacification Process, the Civilizing Process, the Humanitarian Revolu-
tion, the Rights Revolution, the Long Peace, the New Peace and so on. Essentially 
he traces the development of ever larger states, with farther reaching political and 
economic interests, which produced civilizations better suited to non-violence and 
able to enforce this state of affairs. He leaves open the question of the neurological 
background which makes these cultural changes possible. The issue he does not 
address directly is that of the propensity of humans to put aside their self-serving, 
aggressive tendencies, in order to cooperate for the general good. In fact, many 
authors point to the cultural forces behind the widening circle of peace, but offer 
no explication as to why humans should be susceptible to these cultural forces in 
the first place. 
2.1 Do we have selfish or altruistic genes?
This question is, however, dealt with in recent work by Martin Nowak, Carina 
Tarnita, and Edward O. Wilson. The problem, first studied by Robert Trivers, 
has always been to explain altruism, since individual genetic selection, on its own, 
would not sustain a genetic adaptation for altruism. Selfish individuals would al-
ways out- reproduce, hence have more inclusive fitness, than altruistic individuals. 
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But recent work has proven that natural selection occurs at both the individual 
and the group level, in what is called multi-level selection. Wilson explains: 
An iron rule exists in genetic evolution. It is that selfish individuals beat altruistic 
individuals, while groups of altruists beat groups of selfish individuals. Each member 
of a society possesses genes whose products are targeted by individual selection and 
genes targeted by group selection. Each individual is linked to a network of other 
group members. Its own survival and reproductive capacity are dependent in part on 
its interaction with others in the network….what counts is the hereditary propensity 
to form myriad alliances, favors, exchanges of information, and betrayals that make 
up daily life in the network. (Wilson, 2012: 243).
Wilson goes on to highlight some of the neurological mechanisms that support 
this behavior and punish cheaters, explaining «In the brain, the administration of 
“altruistic punishment” lights up the bilateral anterior insula, a center of the brain 
also activated by pain, anger, and disgust» (Wilson, 2012: 251). In The Neuroscience 
of Fair Play (2007), Donald Pfaff shows how fear impulses from the amygdala can 
be suppressed by circuits in the anterior cingulate cortex and the insula, which 
enable ethical behavioral choices rather than simple reaction. It would seem, then, 
that the constant battle between cooperation and betrayal is a product of gene-
culture co-evolution. We are predisposed to be both selfish and altruistic, but not 
entirely constrained in either direction. So I return to my original question, which 
is what impact can a humanizing discourse have on these counterbalanced ethical 
decisions. To whom do I owe my allegiance, to self, group, family, tribe, class, 
race, or any of the other myriad entities seeking my loyalty and commitment? 
3.  Can literature make selfish people altruistic? Carlos Ruiz Zafón and 
Eduardo Mendoza
«A world of disorderly notions, picked out of books, crowded into his 
imagination»
Miguel de Cervantes—Don Quixote
 
Still wondering, I returned from the conference to Valencia, where I spent the 
next three months hearing about la crisis everyday on the morning news. The crisis 
referred to here is that part of the current global economic crisis affecting Spain, 
and it was, fundamentally, what my friend at the Ateneo was referring to as well. 
Essentially, the issue was one of selfish interests versus the common good, of the 
power of money, or perhaps better, greed, to corrupt cooperative civil action. In 
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addition to listening to and reading the news, I spent the afternoons reading the 
latest commentary on the society that produced it by a couple of Spain’s more 
influential humanists, at least in terms of their popularity with the general public, 
namely Carlos Ruiz Zafón and Eduardo Mendoza. Could, or did, their humanistic 
discourse tilt the balance of ethical decisions from local to global, or at least na-
tional, allegiance?
Now there are certainly those who would argue that what people say on Twit-
ter or Facebook is far more influential and representative of the general flow of 
public discourse, and maybe that’s true, but the two authors I have mentioned do 
sell a lot of books to a middlebrow crowd, are consulted as to their opinions on 
television and in various newspapers, and even have some resonance in university 
academic circles, where articles are written about them and their books are taught in 
the occasional literature class. So they do seem to represent one measure of public 
discourse regarding the state of the country and, I would argue, they constitute a 
fairly influential facet of that discourse in that they both reflect and help to con-
struct public opinion.
In Ruiz Zafón’s book, El juego del ángel (2008), the protagonist is a writer named 
David Martín. In the novel, part of a trilogy set around the time of the Spanish 
Civil War, Martín rises by dint of his innate artistic ability from an impoverished 
childhood, in which he is abandoned by his mother and abused by his criminal/
junkie father, to become a successful writer. Two people are instrumental in sav-
ing him from life in the underclasses, an aristocratic aficionado of the arts and 
would-be writer, Pedro Vidal, and the kindly and wise owner of a small but dis-
criminating bookstore, Sempere senior of Sempere e Hijos. It is Sempere who, by 
way of not so subtle foreshadowing, gives Martín his first book, Charles Dickens’ 
Great Expectations. Unfortunately, thereafter small businessman Sempere is able to 
offer only moral support as he is unceasingly on the verge of bankruptcy, while 
the rich aristocrat Vidal trades jobs and influence for a debt of guilty gratitude 
and compliance.
Though Martín is blessed with rare artistic talent, he is continuously at the 
mercy of commercial publishing interests, and so taken advantage of by them. 
His initial writing assignment, a serial novel entitled Los misterios de Barcelona, is 
for the newspaper La Voz de la Industria, which first capitalizes on his ability for 
slave wages then fires him. His next writing job is with a medium size publisher, 
Barrido y Escobillas, who were looking for «sangre fresca que exprimir y explotar» 
(Ruiz, 2012: 70). In exchange for writing two hundred pages a month, under 
a pseudonym, of a series called La ciudad de los malditos, «tramadas de intrigas, 
asesinatos de alta sociedad, horrors sin cuento en los bajos fondos, amores ilícitos 
entre cruel hacendados de mandíbulo firme y damiselas de inconfesables anhelos, 
y toda suerte de retorcidas sagas familiars con trasfondos más espesos y turbios 
158 RECERCA, 13. 2013. ISSN: 1130-6149 - DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/Recerca.2013.13.10 - pp. 153-170
que las aguas del Puerto» (Ruiz, 2012: 71), he is paid a small wage and receives 
no author’s rights. 
The work is a success and attracts the attention of a larger international 
publisher. Martín is offered a small fortune to work for this Paris firm, Éditions de 
la Lumière. The editor is Andreas Corelli and, as becomes clear in the novel, Corelli 
is the devil incarnate. In exchange for filthy lucre the artist has, literally, signed a 
deal with the devil. He is commissioned to create a work following the devil’s own 
design. And if that weren’t enough, the love of his life, Cristina Sagnier, uses guilt 
and his repressed love of her to force him to anonymously write a novel that his 
old patron, Pedro Vidal, can claim as his own. Yet another deal with the devil. 
Because of all this Martín’s life follows the paths of the characters in La ciudad de 
los malditos, and so the author of noir detective books comes to live the life of his 
fictional characters.
But what is it that the devil wants? According to Corelli, Martín must create 
a new religion, as apparently the devil is less than satisfied with his place in the 
current one. But the essential point is the role of narrative in the new enterprise. 
Corelli explains, that «una religión viene a ser un código moral que se expresa 
mediante leyendas, mitos o cualquier tipo de artefacto literario a fin de establecer 
un sistema de creencias, valores y normas con los que regular una cultura o una 
sociedad» (Ruiz, 2012: 186). And if the emphasis on narrative weren’t sufficiently 
apparent in the first explanation, Corelli makes sure Martín gets the connection 
between narration and belief: «Todo es un cuento Martín. Lo que creemos, lo que 
conocemos, lo que recordamos e incluso lo que soñamos. Todo es un cuento, una 
narración, una secuencia de sucesos y personajes que comunican un contenido 
emocional. Un acto de fe es un acto de aceptación, una aceptación de una historia 
que se nos cuenta. Sólo aceptamos como verdadero aquello que puede ser narrado» 
(187).
A bit later on in the novel Corelli explains why narrative has such a potent effect: 
«el acto de creer en mitos o ideologías o leyendas sobrenaturales, es consecuencia 
de la biología….La fe es una respuesta instintiva a aspectos de la existencia que 
no podemos explicar de otro modo….es simple y pura biología» (Ruiz, 2012: 258). 
And finally, Corelli argues for our instinctive reaction to art as the motor that 
drives our lives, «Por eso necesito algo más poderoso que una simple exposición 
retórica. Necesito la fuerza del arte, de la puesta en escena. La letra de la canción 
es lo que creemos entender, pero lo que nos hace creerla o no es la música» (Ruiz, 
2012: 261). Essentially, then, the devil is arguing that the drive to create and believe 
stories, and to act upon these beliefs, is an adaptation via natural selection, and one 
that he can control.
4. Narrative is an adaptation that has evolved by natural selection.
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God made Man because He loves stories
Ellie Wiesel—The Gates of the Forest
To say that narrative is an adaptation that has evolved by natural selection is 
a statement that, for some, might require a bit of evidence.  I therefore ask the 
reader’s indulgence while I briefly play the role of the devil’s advocate in an attempt 
to demonstrate the genetic foundations of narrative. As we progress from infants to 
adults in a given society or societies, we produce various narrative systems –eve-
rything from the clothes we wear, the food we eat, the music we listen to, and the 
cars we drive tell our stories– but language is one of the first systems we develop, 
and it is a primordial measure of narrative, so we can start with it. As is well known, 
language is universal across human societies. Every neurologically normal person 
learns the language, or languages, of his or her society. Indeed, humans learn the 
exact dialect of not only their society but of their socio-economic class and age 
group. All of these are systematic and rule-governed, and none are simple or «primi-
tive» (McWhorter, 2002: 94). All human languages conform to a universal design or 
universal grammar as Chomsky would have it, and all children pass through a uni-
versal series of stages during language acquisition (Baker, 2001: 114; Pinker, 1994: 
86). Even their errors are systematic, and don’t come from their parents’ input, but 
rather from the aforementioned universal grammar all humans share (Crain, 1992: 
75). And as Derek Bickerton’s work on Creole languages in Hawaii has shown, 
children thrown together without a common language will invent a new one, and it 
will have all the grammatical features of our shared universal grammar (Bickerton, 
1990: 39). A similar result was observed in the case of deaf children in Nicaragua, 
who on their own developed a complex sign language to use amongst themselves 
(Dessalles, 2007: 70-73). Additionally, language and general intelligence are doubly 
dissociable in neurological and genetic disorders such as aphasias and Specific Lan-
guage Impairment syndrome. In these cases, very intelligent people can have serious 
problems in speaking and understanding, while severely mentally retarded people 
can have no difficulties in these areas (Siegal y et al, 2001: 298 ). 
Furthermore, as Steven Pinker points out, recent advances in molecular and 
population genetics demonstrate that language shows evidence of a history of 
selection. He cites studies that have identified a gene on Chromosome 7, FOXP2, 
which is associated with Specific Language Impairment Syndrome, and whose 
normal allele «plays a causal role in the development of the brain circuitry underlying 
language and speech, rather than merely disrupting that circuitry when mutated” 
(Pinker, 2002: 34). He goes on to affirm there are many genes for language, and 
discusses other loci, distinct from FOXP2, as well as detailing quantitative data 
which demonstrate a history of genetic selection based on statistical patterns of 
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variation among genes (Krietman, 2000: 542; Przeworski y et al, 2000: 301). Finally, 
Enard y et al report in Nature that the FOXP2 gene has been a target of direct 
selection in humans for «the last 200,000 years of human history» (Enard, 2002: 3), 
and Dean Hamer chronicles a statistically significant relation between the VMAT2 
gene and spirituality in humans. Humans are genetically disposed «to believe in 
things they cannot see, smell, taste, hear, or touch» (Hamer, 2005: 6), precisely the 
kinds of things narratives ask them to believe.
In addition to language, and a number of other psychological and emotional 
propensities, narrative too is innate in humans. First of all, we know it develops 
spontaneously in the individual. In the first five years of life children develop 
language and narrative, which enables them to arrive at a conscious awareness of 
both self and the external socio-cultural world. At the age of about nine months 
(Tomasello, 1995: 452) the infant becomes aware of social signals of which he 
or she was previously ignorant. These first stirrings of intersubjectivity open the 
door for language acquisition. From the age of 1 to 2 years language ability and 
cognitive functions improve, but the child still lacks temporal perspective and 
multiple world views (Nelson, 1999: 262). At about one year they can remember 
only brief sequences of events (Bauer and Mandler, 1990: 21), but as language 
ability grows, narratives of the cultural and social milieu become accessible and the 
child begins to insert himself into this larger story. At three years they can relate a 
number of familiar events in reliable sequence (Nelson and Grundel, 1981: 144). 
Preschoolers, between the ages of two and a half to five years, gradually learn to 
produce rudimentary narratives, but still have difficulty incorporating both temporal 
perspectives and essential cultural knowledge, and also have trouble distinguishing 
between self and others (Nelson, 2003: 22). Gradually, through a growing awareness 
of the larger socio-cultural narrative, the child learns to differentiate himself from 
others by defining his own role in this larger social story. Self-consciousness is 
defined in relation to others, who are defined narratologically. By the age of six a 
child has fully developed the narrative mechanisms which will define his ideas of 
self, other, and all things real and imagined for the rest of his life. 
To explain the innateness of narrative, many have argued that there is a narrative 
proclivity hard-wired into the human mind, waiting only to be triggered by exposure 
to the social world in infancy and then exploding when language becomes available 
(Bruener, 1990: 160). Because narratives universally appear as the same social forms—
myths of origin, explanatory myths, definitions of group identity, moral and ethical 
guidelines, and so on—a universal narratological grammar appears to be innate in 
humans. As with their native language, children inevitably grow into the existing cultural 
narratives and myths of their native society, just as humans have done for thousands of 
generations (Hendriks-Jansen, 1996: 46). So as individuals we appear to have inherited 
a uniquely human ability for narrative, a complex socio-biological adaptation (a trait 
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whose genetic basis was shaped by natural selection) evolved by way of natural selection 
over the past eight million years or so.  But why did this come about?
4.1 The adaptive use of narrative: The Tsembaga, and other examples
As always when talking about stories, another story can serve to illustrate the 
first. In a book that was hugely influential in the United States in the 1970s and 80s, 
prompting as it did the sustainable ecology movement, Pigs for the Ancestors (1968), 
Roy A. Rappaport analyzes the ten—to twenty—year ritual cycle of the Tsembaga 
Maring of colonial New Guinea. The Tsembaga cultural narrative is based on sup-
posed debts owed to the ancestors, these represented by two sets of spirits, called the 
Red Spirits and the Spirits of Rot. In the Maring view, in order to appease the spirits 
of the dead ancestors the living must engage in a cycle of ritualized warfare, animal 
husbandry, agriculture, marriage, reproduction, and various other social rituals and 
taboos, all regulated by the kaiko, a ritual pig sacrifice to the ancestral guardians. 
The net effect of this cycle is to maintain a sustainable balance between and within 
the human population and the natural environment through time.  The taboos on 
sowing certain plants too often or too closely together prevent crop diseases. Sexual 
taboos limit population increase, as does the ritualized warfare. Taboos on eating 
certain animals at certain times conserve the fauna of the area. Ritual exchange and 
marriage between groups facilitate trade and mitigate against genetic maladies. In 
the final analysis, the Tsembaga do all the right things for all the wrong reasons, 
because as far as they are concerned they are dealing with spiritual concerns, not 
ecological matters. They have co-evolved, along with their natural environment, an 
ecosocial system that, barring drastic change, could last indefinitely, and it is based 
on an irrational cosmology (unless of course the Red Spirits actually exist). 
The primary contribution of Rappaport’s book is to show that myth and ritual 
are functional elements in maintaining both intraand extrasocial relations (or eco-
logical balance). That is, the stories societies tell themselves at the manifest level 
enable human populations to optimize their adaptations to the environment and to 
maintain undegraded local and regional ecosystems, and at the same time maintain 
their system of social stratification intact. Importantly, this happens in spite of the 
fact that they are unaware of this process, and so have quite different readings of 
their own myths and rituals. The stories vary from culture to culture, but their ul-
timate function does not. For Rappaport, narrative mediates the relation between 
society and nature.
The standard criticisms of Rappaport’s analysis are first that there are no isolated 
ecosystems today and that all humans participate in a global system. One can coun-
ter by observing that not only primitive but also modern myths, the ratio-scientific 
mode included, fall into the pattern Rappaport exposed, and so in Modernity the 
global rather than local or regional use of narratives is simply a quantitative differ-
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ence. In this sense, scientific narrative is functionally indistinguishable from mythical 
narrative. Secondly, it has been argued that either culture is sui generis, autonomous 
and explicable in its own terms, an idealist position, or epiphenomenal, explicable 
completely in terms of nature, a materialist position. Following Rappaport, I will 
argue that there is a relation of feedback between the two via human narration, and 
so the two—society and Nature—are separate but dialectically linked by how they 
influence each other. Social narratives mediate this relation. Finally, it has been ob-
jected that natural selection operates on the individual rather than on the ecosystem, 
society, or culture. There is today a growing body of evidence supporting group se-
lection over individual selection (Bloom, 2000: 3-13), especially the aforementioned 
work of Martin Nowak, Carina Tarnita, and Edward O. Wilson. Their research has 
refuted the Hamilton inequality (1964), (rb>c), which held that natural selection oc-
curred only at the level of the individual, and that any altruistic behavior reflected 
the degree of relatedness of the actor to the recipient of said behavior, the so-called 
«inclusive fitness”. Novak and company showed that natural selection takes place at 
both the individual and the group level, what they call multilevel selection. This is 
because selfish individuals compete better against altruistic individuals, but altruistic 
groups compete better against selfish groups. In order for these groups to cooperate 
against other groups they need a driving mechanism, and this appears to be reli-
giously inspired narrative, or better, narrative grounded in faith, since in modernity 
that faith is not always in religion.  
This also serves to answer another question, that of the very existence of 
religion, which is hard to explain unless we take all religions at their word when 
it comes to the existence of their gods. If, however, the gods do not exist, then 
religious people the world over systematically err in their judgments about the 
world. Normally, living organisms get the world right, as it is often crucial to their 
survival that they do so. Yet humans universally develop non-empirically supported 
religious beliefs, even in scientifically advanced societies, that encourage costly 
behavior (Godfrey-Smith, 1996: 143). Participants routinely subject themselves to 
fatigue, injury, and bodily harm, and in extreme cases willingly participate in suicide 
bombings, genital mutilation, and voluntary celibacy. All this, and much more, is 
done in the name of supernatural gods with supernatural powers that neither the 
believers nor anyone else has ever seen or directly experienced. Indeed, the poverty 
of supernatural stimulus is nearly complete, which begs the question: Why do the 
followers of any religion not only believe in an unseen spirit world, but also devote 
a large measure of their wealth, time, and energy to this super-nature? The devil in 
Ruiz Zafón’s book argues it is to get people to do what they cannot be rationally 
convinced to do. And since the process is innate and universal—children universally 
and automatically develop religious beliefs even in atheistic homes (Bulbulia, 2007: 
625) —it must be an adaptation by natural selection.
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Examples of narratological adaptation abound. As Claude Levi-Strauss detailed 
in The Elementary Structures of Kinship, early human societies separated into moieties, 
groups narratologically identified with various opposing forces of the natural 
world—earth and sky, night and day, etc—whose members were forbidden to 
marry each other, but rather had to pick mates from other moieties, thus avoiding 
inbreeding. The Montagnais-Laskapi of the Labrador plateau north of Quebec 
utilize divination by burnt animal bones to direct their hunts.  This rite of divination 
introduces a randomizing element into their hunting pattern, assuring that they 
will not always be successful. This apparently irrational magic serves the very 
rational function of preventing over-harvesting of game animals, and so functions 
to maintain a balance between the human and animal population (Moore, 1969: 
17-43). We can also cite the “superstitions” of the peasant community on Sardinia, 
one of the effects of which is to prevent pregnant women, who are particularly 
susceptible, from venturing into the malarious lowlands (Brown, 1997: 241). Many 
more examples could be given, we’ve not even mentioned Marvin Harris or E.E. 
Evans-Pritchard, but the best evidence is to point to the sheer number of societies, 
all through the course of human history, that have co-evolved long-standing 
relations with their natural environment by means of “irrational” beliefs in myth and 
magic. Indeed, the only examples of the “rational” type have occurred with the rise 
of industrial society over the last few hundred years, and their continued existence 
is far from guaranteed, and their belief systems far from rational. 
4.2 Who controls narrative?
«Where they burn books they will ultimately burn people».
Heinrich Heine—Almansor 
(burned, along with many other books, by the Nazis on the night of        May 10, 
1933)
The interesting aspect of this process is that it seems to be beyond the control 
of any individual. What Zafón appears to be saying in El juego del ángel is that artistic 
discourse is controlled by the ruling elite, in this case the international publishing 
company whose power and money have eliminated local alternatives. You can write 
what you want, but to get it published you have to toe the line of the powers that 
be. The rich and powerful elites thus control public discourse, and so control our 
motivating faiths and beliefs, thus ultimately our actions. On this view the search for 
the truth is like a dark detective mystery, one detective/writer against the world, and 
the world usually wins. Therefore, to get back to my doubts from the Ateneo about 
whether the world would be a better place if only the scientists in it were given a 
strong dose of humanities, it seems the answer from at least one leading Spanish 
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humanist is that this can never happen under our current system. Those in charge 
are not going to cede control over public discourse to a competitor, though they are 
certainly willing to decorate their enterprises with the trappings of a kinder, gentler 
humanism. And so, essentially, Spanish artists and writers are not responsible for 
the current crisis or any other, given that the choice is make a deal with the devil or 
lose everything, as happened to Martín in the novel when he tried to renege on his 
Faustian agreement.
But before we draw too grave a conclusion from but one example, let’s take a 
look at a recent contribution from another hugely successful contemporary Spanish 
writer, the aforementioned Eduardo Mendoza. Mendoza’s 2010 novel, which won 
the Premio Planeta in 2010, is titled Riña de gatos: Madrid 1936. The book deals with 
the visit to Madrid of an English art expert, Anthony Whitelands, to verify the 
authenticity of a painting, supposedly a previously unknown work by Velázquez. 
The painting in question is owned by an aristocratic family with ties to the family 
of Miguel Primo de Rivera, former Spanish dictator from 1923 to 1930. The former 
dictator’s son, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, plays an active role in the novel, in 
that he is the leader of the Falangist party, and the funds derived from the sale of 
the painting are destined to buy arms for his revolutionary group. 
What the novel actually deals with is the confusion that reigns amongst 
politicians, lovers, intellectuals, spies, and everyone else involved in the plot of the 
book. For example, Whitelands is leaving England partly to get away from an illicit 
affair he is having with the wife of an old university friend. He can’t decide if he 
loves her, if she loves him, and whether he should end it or not. At the beginning 
of the novel he is leaving to end it, but at the end of the book he is returning to 
England possibly to restart the relation. In the meantime he has had three affairs 
in Madrid, two with minors, and none of the three women are certain as to their 
feelings for him, or of his for them. He himself is constantly changing his own 
opinion on the matters.
He was recruited for the mission by one Pedro Teacher, a semi-reputable art 
merchant and sometime German spy, or perhaps double or even triple agent, no 
one knows for sure. Whitelands does know that the man who introduced him to 
one of his teenage lovers later saved his life. He thought the man a good citizen, 
but at the end of the novel we find out the individual in question, Higinio Zamora 
Zamorano, was a British spy who also worked for the Russian secret service, the 
NKVD. The NKVD had another agent as well, the mysterious Kolia, who may 
have secretly been anybody, perhaps even José Antonio Primo de Rivera, but we 
never do find out who he really was. 
The spies and the politicians who run them are all interested in either having the 
Velázquez authenticated or in having it declared a forgery, in function of whether 
they want the Falange to get the money for arms and so start serious trouble or 
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not. The politicians, however, are as misguided in their reading of world events as 
everyone else is. At the end of the novel Lord Bumblebee, head of the British secret 
service, tells Whitelands:
No se preocupe por su amigo Primo; no le pasará nada. El fascism es un incordio, 
pero no es un problema. El problema viene de Rusia. Tarde o temprano Inglaterra 
habrá de aliarse con Alemania para hacerse frente a la amenaza comunista….Su 
majestad [Eduardo VIII] así lo entiende y no oculta sus simpatías por Hitler. Hitler 
no es un demócrata cabal, es cierto, pero la política no permite hacer distingos. 
(Mendoza, 2010: 421).
And while this prognostication could not have been more wrong for the Second 
World War, it proved correct, at least in part, for the Cold War.
In order to get the assessment they want of the painting, the British Secret Ser-
vice brings in Whitelands’s mortal adversary, Edwin Garrigaw, head of the National 
Gallery in London, and the other world-renowned expert on Velázquez. Garrigaw, 
naturally, sees the painting as a forgery, while Whitelands considers it authentic, 
although their official views go back and forth depending on whether the British 
want to support the fascists or the communists at a given moment. Nevertheless, the 
struggle to determine the truth of art exemplifies the struggles to find the truth in the 
other aspects of the novel, from love to politics to identity. The ambiguity inherent 
in the discourse of art symbolizes, literally, the ambiguity in how both people and 
events are read and misread in the novel. One example of this is a painting by Titian 
called The Death of Actaeon (1560-70). The subject of the painting follows Ovid’s ac-
count in the «Metamorphoses». In revenge for surprising her as she bathed naked in 
the woods, the goddess Diana transformed Actaeon into a stag and his own hounds 
attacked and killed him. A copy of the painting hangs in the entryway of the house 
of the Duke of Igualada, the owner of the disputed Velázquez. It is the first painting 
Whitelands sees on his trip to Madrid. He immediately comments on the ambiguity 
in the painting, «Tiziano representa la escena de un modo incoherente» (32), and 
then gives various possible interpretations, without settling on any particular one. 
This because he has just arrived in Spain and the painting refers to, among other 
things, the situation in Spain.
Another character, the leader of the ruling party, Manuel Azaña, also weighs in. 
Referring to the painting, Azaña says «Tiziano elige un punto medio en el decurso 
de la fábula: lo escencial ya ha ocurrido o está por ocurrir… El momento en que 
la falta ya ha sido cometido y la flecha ha sido lanzado. Lo demás es cuestión de 
tiempo: el desenlace es inevitable» (Mendoza, 2010:337). As in the case of White-
lands, this assessment reflects the view in Spain just prior to the outbreak of the 
civil war. It is also worth noting that the traditional interpretation of the painting 
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is that of the hunter who becomes the hunted, an ironic development portrayed 
through the ages, the latest example being Llewelyn Moss (Josh Brolin) and Anton 
Chigurh (Javier Bardem) in the Coen brothers’ film No Country for Old Men (2007). 
And this interpretation, too, has resonance in the upcoming Spanish civil war. 
Later, Whitelands returns to the home of the Duke of Igualada, views the painting 
again, and concludes that in the painting Titian portrays «…el castigo irracional y 
desmesurado impuesto por una diosa cautiva de su simbología y de su poder sin 
trabas. Diana dominaba la escena, como las fuerzas despiadadas que se abaten sobre 
los hombres: como la enfermedad, como la Guerra, como las pasiones malsanas» 
(Mendoza, 2010:345). And these last are, of course, the same forces that are beating 
down upon Whitelands and Spain. 
As in political discourse, emotional discourse, and espionage, pinning down one 
fixed truth, in the interplay of symbols and messages in art, becomes a subjective 
enterprise. On this view, the artist escapes responsibility for the actions of others 
by nature of the very ambiguity inherent in the work of art. It is, however, worth 
noting that the various antagonists—lovers, spies, and politicians—do cooperate to 
extricate Whitelands from his various predicaments, saving his life in the process, 
and return him to England safe and sound. The implication here is that public dis-
course, in the person of Whitelands, who ties all the different subplots together, can 
engender cooperation amongst adversarial positions. Human society is a combina-
tion of altruism and egoism, with both being difficult to recognize correctly. Is the 
Velázquez a fake or authentic? It depends.
With reference now to our original question, that of the possible pacifying 
effects of the discourse of the humanities, at least two points emerge from Ruiz 
Zafón’s and Mendoza’s subtexts. The first is that the effects of public discourse 
are unpredictable, given the ambiguities inherent in the messages and symbols 
of art, literature, politics, religion, love, and so on. The second, which follows 
from the first, is that artists bear no responsibility for social conditions, given 
that they have no control over how their messages will be interpreted. We can’t 
tell the real painting from the fake, true love from false, a double agent from a 
triple agent, nor an accurate political prognostication from a self-justifying con-
fabulation. Apparently, no one is actually responsible for the actions of society, 
since no one knows the truth, and it appears to matter little in any event. And 
besides, the rich devils that run the huge corporations, and publishing houses, 
are too powerful to control even if we knew what was best. And if we think 
logic and reason can save us, we need think again. As Kurt Gödel and Bertrand 
Russell have shown, logic itself is inherently self-contradictory, and Freud dem-
onstrated the rational mind was seldom in charge anyway. The Frankfnrt School 
has argued convincingly that the fetishization of reason has produced a modern 
myth that simply replaced the pre-enlightenment superstitions from which it 
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sought to free us, becoming a negative dialectic in the process by going from 
controlling nature to controlling society. Max Weber made a similar case, argu-
ing that Reason was simply an instrument in the hands of those wishing to gain 
control. Nietzsche was equally dubious of transcendental truths, writing “facts 
are precisely what there is not, only interpretations» (Nietzsche, 1968:267). And 
modern psychology has demonstrated that we deceive ourselves constantly and 
don’t even realize it.
There does appear to be, however, some sort of universal grammar involved in 
social discourse. Returning to Rappaport’s work with the Tsembaga, we can note 
that their religious discourse made them do the right thing for the wrong reasons, 
and history is full of similar examples. Ethical considerations seem initially to be 
constrained by social discourse, rather than the other way round. Some discourses 
gain traction, while the rest do not, and then they become naturalized. From faith 
in religion to «the invisible hidden hand of the market», the Five Year plan of the 
Politburo, the scientific method, or the word of the Prophet, questionable assump-
tions have brought fairly decent results. Humans have grown and prospered, gone 
from worshipping the moon to walking on it, and all the while guided by irrational 
narratives. If the positions of Ruiz Zafón and Mendoza appear apologist, they may 
still be quite defensible. If the dominant discourse of a society is indeed irrational, 
and beyond the control of anyone, much like Saussure’s langne, then artists who fail 
to speak out against the current, or in fact any crisis, are off the hook. Ruiz Zafón’s 
character Martín sacrificed all in fighting the devil, with very little to show for it. 
Mendoza’s Velázquez couldn’t have been more cooperative with Felipe IV, and 
was richly rewarded, while his argumentative Golden Age contemporary Lope was 
forced to choose between death and exile to Valencia, and was then punished with 
what he felt to be the worst of the two possibilities. 
5. By way of conclusion
It is undeniable, then, that there is something in humans, a narrative propensity, 
an adaptation that has evolved through natural selection over thousands of genera-
tions, which enables humans to cooperate in groups in order to persevere through 
changing environments, be they climactic, social, or economic, ice ages, wars, or 
crisis. These genetic predispositions are triggered by environmental stimuli, and so 
are susceptible to discovery, explanation and, yes, manipulation, and we have al-
ready seen the beginnings of a genetic engineering which appears capable of massive 
control. We can at present use genetic screening to avoid diseases, genetic therapy 
to cure disease, cosmetic genetics to choose eye and hair color, pigmentation, and 
body build. Many mental and emotional conditions, such as I.Q. are hereditary, 
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and so in principal there is nothing to stop us from selecting for these through the 
so-called designer genes (Potter, 2010:162-75), a lá Andrew Niccole in his 2007 
film GATTACA. At some point they must surely be understood, and then the real 
question of the relative power and influence of the humanities and the sciences will 
come to the fore. It would seem that at some point a neurocultural approach will 
provide either the ultimate breakthrough or the ultimate breakdown. And when it 
comes we’ll not be able to decide which it is.
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